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Monetary Rules in Emerging 
Economies with Financial 
Market Imperfections
Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
5.1    Introduction
Over the past twenty years there has been a marked shift toward more ﬂ  ex-
ible exchange rate regimes and more open capital accounts by both indus-
trial and emerging market countries. Exchange rate targets accounted for 
over half of monetary policy regimes in 1985, but declined to just 5 percent 
in 2005, while in emerging market and other developing countries the share 
fell from 75 percent to 55 percent.
The move to more ﬂ  exible exchange rate regimes has been accompanied 
by a variety of frameworks to conduct monetary policy, including inﬂ  a-
tion targeting, monetary targeting, and more eclectic approaches involving 
multiple objectives. In industrial countries, exchange rate pegs and mon-
etary targets have been replaced by eclectic regimes in G- 3 countries, and by 
direct inﬂ  ation targets almost everywhere else. In emerging market countries 
exchange rate pegs were replaced mainly by money targets through the mid- 
1990s. Since then, however, money targets as well as exchange rate pegs have 
been replaced by direct inﬂ  ation targets.
Over the next few years, the trend toward adoption of ﬂ  exible exchange 
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rate regimes, and inﬂ  ation targeting in particular, is expected to continue. 
A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey of eighty-  eight non-
industrial countries found that more than half expressed a desire to move 
to explicit or implicit quantitative inﬂ  ation targets. Moreover, nearly three- 
quarters of these countries envisage a shift to full- ﬂ  edged inﬂ  ation targeting 
by 2010 (Batini, Breuer, and Kochhar 2006).
While there are undoubtedly countries where inﬂ  ation targeting may not 
be a suitable framework, it is a ﬂ  exible framework that can be adapted to 
particular needs of nonindustrial countries. Nonindustrial country inﬂ  ation 
targeters face a number of challenges that diﬀer in character or in degree 
from those faced in industrial economies. Calvo and Mishkin (2003) high-
light ﬁ  ve particularly important challenges for emerging market countries. 
These include: (a) weak public sector ﬁ  nancial management; (b) weak ﬁ  nan-
cial sector institutions and markets; (c) low monetary policy credibility; 
(d) extensive dollarization of ﬁ  nancial liabilities; and (e) vulnerability to 
sharp changes in capital ﬂ  ows and international investor sentiment. In addi-
tion, many of these countries face considerably greater uncertainty about the 
structure of their economies, the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
and the cyclical position of the economy than is typical of industrial country 
inﬂ  ation targeters.
Our goal in this chapter is to understand whether, for nonindustrial coun-
tries facing such challenges, inﬂ  ation targets are better or worse than (ﬁ  x 
or soft) exchange rate targets. In particular we try to answer two central 
questions:
1.  How do ﬁ  nancial frictions in emerging markets aﬀect the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and the volatility of the economy?
2. Can and should central banks in emerging markets facing ﬁ  nancial 
frictions and vulnerable to combination of internal and external shocks try 
to balance inﬂ  ation and exchange rate stabilization objectives?
We address these questions by developing a two-  bloc emerging market, 
a rest of the world dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
where, in the emerging market bloc there is a strong link between changes 
in the exchange rate and ﬁ  nancial distress of household and ﬁ  rms. More 
precisely, we assume that: (a) there are ﬁ  nancial frictions in the form of a 
“ﬁ  nancial accelerator,” since ﬁ  rms are obliged to ﬁ  nance at least part of their 
capital requirements in foreign currency (see Gertler, Gilchrist, and Nata-
lucci [2003] and Gilchrist [2003]); (b) domestic households hold both local 
and foreign currency money balances for transaction purposes; and (c) the 
relative demand of foreign currency is endogenous to the extent of exchange 
rate stabilization by the central bank. The simultaneous assumption of (a) 
through (c) is novel in the literature.
We shock the model to understand how such ﬁ  nancial frailties aﬀect mon-
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bloc. Using welfare analysis, we then compare the performance of monetary 
policy rules with diﬀerent degrees of exchange rate ﬂ  exibility and identify the 
rule for the emerging market central bank that responds to a combination 
of internal and external shocks at the smallest welfare cost.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the 
model. Section 5.3 sets out the form of monetary rules under investigation. 
In section 5.4 we study an analytically tractable form of the model without 
capital. The focus here is on the eﬀects of transactions dollarization. In 
section 5.5 we explore the workings of the model and the monetary trans-
mission mechanism in particular; we examine, under optimal policy, the 
volatility of key economic variables in the domestic economy and impulse 
response functions to a technology shock and to the country’s borrowing 
premium shock. In section 5.6 we derive and compare alternative monetary 
policy rules that encompass various degrees of exchange rate ﬂ  exibility, 
with, at one extreme, inﬂ  ation targeting under a pure ﬂ  oat, and at the other 
extreme, ﬁ  xed exchange rates. Both domestic and consumer price inﬂ  ation 
targets are examined. Section 5.7 addresses the requirement that monetary 
rules should be operational in the sense that, in the face of shocks, the zero 
lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is very rarely hit. Section 
5.8 provides concluding remarks.
5.2    The  Model
We start from a standard two-  bloc microfounded model along the lines 
of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) to then incorporate many of the nominal and 
real frictions that have been shown to be empirically important in the study 
of closed economies (e.g., Smets and Wouters 2003). The blocs are asymmet-
ric and unequally sized, each one with diﬀerent household preferences and 
technologies. The single small open economy then emerges as the limit when 
the relative size of the larger bloc tends to inﬁ  nity. Households work, save, 
and consume tradable goods produced both at home and abroad. At home 
there are three types of ﬁ  rms: wholesale, retail, and capital producers. As in 
Gertler et al. (2003), wholesale ﬁ  rms borrow from households to buy capital 
used in production and capital producers build new capital in response to the 
demand of wholesalers. Wholesalers’ demand for capital in turn depends on 
their ﬁ  nancial position which varies inversely with wholesalers’ net worth.
There are four departures from the standard open economy model that 
lead to interesting results. First, money enters utility in a nonseparable way 
and results in a direct impact of the interest rate on the supply side.1 Sec-
ond, in the emerging market bloc, households derive utility from holding 
both domestic and foreign money (dollars) balances as in Felices and Tuesta 
1. See Woodford (2003, chapter 4). A “cost channel,” as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006), has 
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(2006). Third, along the lines of Gilchrist (2003) (see also Cespedes, Chang, 
and Velasco [2004]), ﬁ  rms face an external ﬁ  nance premium that increases 
with leverage and part of the debt of wholesale ﬁ  rms is ﬁ  nanced in foreign 
currency (dollars), because it is impossible for ﬁ  rms to borrow 100 percent 
in domestic currency owing to “original sin”- type constraints. Finally, there 
are frictions in the world ﬁ  nancial markets facing households as in Benigno 
(2001). Departures two and three add an additional dimension to openness 
itself, namely one whereby domestic agents not only hold foreign bonds 
and derive utility from consuming foreign produced goods, as in standard 
open economy models, but also borrow in foreign currency from domestic 
agents and derive utility from holding foreign money balances. Details of 
the model are as follows.
5.2.1    Households
Normalizing the total population to be unity, there are   households in 
the “home,” emerging economy bloc and (1 –   ) households in the “foreign” 
bloc. A representative household h in the home bloc maximizes
(1)  Et 
t=0
 







, Lt(h), εC,t, εMH,t, εMF,t, εL,t),
where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at 
time t,   is the household’s discount factor, Ct(h) is a Dixit-  Stiglitz index 
of consumption deﬁ  ned following in equation (5), MH,t(h) and MF,t(h) are 
end- of- period nominal domestic and foreign currency balances, respectively, 
P t is a Dixit-  Stiglitz price index deﬁ  ned in equation (11), St is the nomi-
nal exchange rate, and Lt(h) are hours worked. A preference shock to the 
marginal utility of consumption is εC,t, and εMH,t, εMF,t, and εL,t are shocks 
to demand for domestic currency, demand for foreign currency, and labor 
supply, respectively. An analogous symmetric intertemporal utility is deﬁ  ned 
for the foreign representative household and the corresponding variables 
(such as consumption) are denoted by Ct∗(h), and so forth.
We incorporate ﬁ  nancial frictions facing households as in Benigno (2001). 
There are two risk free one-  period bonds denominated in the currencies 
of each bloc with payments in period t, BH,t, and BF,t, respectively, in (per 
capita) aggregate. The prices of these bonds are given by
P B,t   
1
 
1   Rn,t
; P∗
B,t   
1
   
(1   R∗
n,t) (StBF,t/Pt)
,
where  ( ) captures the cost in the form of a risk premium for home house-
holds to hold foreign bonds. We assume  (0)   0 and      0. The nominal 
interest rate over the interval [t, t   1] are denoted by Rn,t and R∗
n,t. For 
analytical convenience, the home households can hold foreign bonds, but 
foreign households cannot hold home bonds. Then the net and gross foreign Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 5 5
assets in the home bloc are equal. The representative household h must obey 
a budget constraint:
(2)  P tCt(h)   P B,tBH,t(h)   P∗
B,tStBF,t(h)   MH,t(h)   StMF,t(h)TF t  
W t(h)Lt(h)   BH,t 1(h)   StBF,t 1(h)   MH,t 1(h)   StMF,t 1(h)     t(h),
where W t(h) is the wage rate and   t(h) are dividends from ownership of ﬁ  rms. 
In addition, if we assume that households’ labor supply is diﬀerentiated with 
elasticity of supply  , then (as we shall see following) the demand for each 
consumer’s labor supplied by   identical households is given by






where W t   [1/  ∑ 
r 1 W t(h)1–   ]1/(1–   ) and Lt   [(1/ )∑ 
r 1 Lt(h)( – 1)/ ] /( – 1) are 
the average wage index and average employment, respectively.
Let the number of diﬀerentiated goods produced in the home and foreign 
blocs be n and (1 –   n), respectively, again normalizing the total number of 
goods in the world at unity. We also assume that the ratio of households 
to ﬁ  rms are the same in each bloc. It follows that n and (1 –   n) (or   and 
[1 –    ]) are measures of size. The per capita consumption index in the home 
bloc is given by
(4)  Ct(h)   [w1/ CH,t(h)(  1)/    (1   w)1/ CF,t(h)(  1)/ ] /(  1)
where   is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods,








=1 ∑ CH,t(f, h)(ζ 1)/ζ
ζ/(ζ 1)
 C F,t(h)   
1
 








∑ CF,t(f, h)(ζ 1)/ζ
ζ/(ζ 1)
,
where CH,t(f, h) and CF,t(f, h) denote the home consumption of household 
h of variety f produced in blocs H and F, respectively, and ζ   1 is the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties in each bloc. Analogous expres-
sions hold for the foreign bloc, which are indicated with a superscript “∗,” 
and we impose ζ   ζ∗ for reasons that become apparent in the section 
on retail ﬁ  rms.2 Weights in the consumption baskets in the two blocs are 
deﬁ  ned by
w   1   (1   n)(1    ); w∗   1   n(1    ∗).
2. Consistently we adopt a notation where subscript H or F refers to goods H or F produced 
in the home and foreign bloc, respectively. The presence (for the foreign bloc) or the absence 
(for the home bloc) of a superscript “∗” indicates where the good is consumed or used as an 
input. Thus, C∗
H,t refers to the consumption of the home good by households in the foreign bloc. 
Parameter   and  ∗ refer to the home and foreign bloc, respectively, and so forth.256    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
In equation (6),  ,  ∗ ∈ [0, 1] are parameters that capture the degree of 
bias in the two blocs. If      ∗   1, we have autarky, while      ∗   0 
gives us the case of perfect integration. In the limit, as the home country 
becomes small, n → 0 and   → 0. Hence, w →   and w∗ → 1. Thus the for-
eign bloc becomes closed, but as long as there is a degree of home bias and 
    0, the home bloc continues to consume foreign produced consumption 
goods.
Denote by P H,t( f ), P F,t( f ) the prices in domestic currency of the good 
produced by ﬁ  rm f in the relevant bloc. Then the optimal intratemporal 
decisions are given by standard results:











(6)  CH,t(h)   w
P H,t  
P t 
  
Ct(h);  CF,t(h)   (1   w)




where aggregate price indexes for domestic and foreign consumption bun-
dles are given by







=1 ∑ P H,t(f)1 ζ
1/(1 ζ)
(8)  P F,t   
1
 








∑ P F,t(f)1 ζ
1/(1 ζ)
,
and the domestic consumer price index P t given by
(9)  P t   [w(P H,t)1     (1   w)(P F,t)1  ]1/(1  ),
with a similar deﬁ  nition for the foreign bloc.
Let St be the nominal exchange rate. The law of one price applies to 
diﬀerentiated goods so that StP∗
F,t/P F,t   StP∗
H,t/P H,t   1. Then it follows that 
the real exchange rate RERt   StP t∗/P t and the terms of trade, deﬁ  ned as 
the domestic currency relative price of imports to exports Tt   P F,t/P H,t, are 
related by the relationship




   
[w∗   (1   w∗)Tt
 ∗ 1]1/(1  ∗)
   
[1   w   wTt
  1]1/(1  ) .
Thus if      ∗, then RERt   1 and the law of one price applies to the 
aggregate price indexes if w∗   1 –   w. The latter condition holds if there is 
no home bias. If there is home bias, the real exchange rate appreciates (RERt 
falls) as the terms of trade deteriorates.
We assume ﬂ  exible wages. Then maximizing equation (1) subject to equa-
tions (3) and (4), treating habit as exogenous, and imposing symmetry on 
households (so that Ct(h)   Ct, etc.) yields standard results:Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 5 7
(11)  P B,t    Et
UC,t 1  
UC,t
 
P t  
P t 1
(12)  UMH,t   UC,t
Rn,t  
1   Rn,t
(13)  UMF,t   UC,t
R∗
n,t  
1   R∗
n,t
(14) 
W t  
P t
    
 
 




where UC,t, UMH,t, UMF,t, and –  UL,t are the marginal utility of consumption, 
money holdings in the two currencies, and the marginal disutility of work, 
respectively. Taking expectations of (13), the familiar Keynes-  Ramsey rule, 
and its foreign counterpart, we arrive at the modiﬁ  ed UIP condition
(15) 
P B,t  
P∗
B,t
   
Et[UC,t 1(P t/P t 1)]
   
Et[UC,t 1(St 1P t/StP t 1)]
.
In (14), the demand for money balances depends positively on the mar-
ginal utility of consumption and negatively on the nominal interest rate. If, 
as is common in the literature, one adopts a utility function that is separable 
in money holdings, then given the central bank’s setting of the latter and 
ignoring seignorage in the government budget constraint money demand is 
completely recursive to the rest of the system describing our macromodel. 
However, separable utility functions are implausible (see Woodford [2003], 
chapter 3, section 3.4) and following Felices and Tuesta (2006) we will not go 
down this route. Finally, in (16) the real disposable wage is proportional to the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, –  UL,t/UC,t, 
and the constant of proportionality reﬂ  ects the market power of households 
that arises from their monopolistic supply of a diﬀerentiated factor input 
with elasticity  .
5.2.2    Firms
There are three types of ﬁ  rms: wholesale, retail, and capital producers. 
Wholesale ﬁ  rms are run by risk- neutral entrepreneurs who purchase capital 
and employ household labor to produce a wholesale good that is sold to 
the retail sector. The wholesale sector is competitive, but the retail sector is 
monopolistically competitive. Retail ﬁ  rms diﬀerentiate the wholesale goods 
at no resource cost and sell the diﬀerentiated (repackaged) goods to house-
holds. The capital goods sector is competitive and converts the ﬁ  nal goods 
into capital. The details are as follows.258    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
Wholesale Firms
Wholesale goods are homogeneous and produced by entrepreneurs who 
combine diﬀerentiated labor and capital with a technology
(16)  Yt
W   AtKt
 Lt
1  ,
where Kt is beginning-  of-  period t capital stock,







∑ Lt(h)(  1)/ 
 /(  1)
,
where we recall that Lt(h) is the labor input of type h, and At is an exogenous 
shock capturing shifts to trend total factor productivity in this sector.3 Mini-
mizing wage costs ∑ 
h 1 W t(h)Lt(h) gives the demand for each household’s 
labor as






Wholesale goods sell at a price PW
H,t in the home bloc. Equating the marginal 
product and cost of aggregate labor gives
(19)  W t   PW
H,t(1    )
Y t  
Lt
.
Let Qt be the real market price of capital in units of total household con-
sumption. Then noting that proﬁ  ts per period are PW
H,tY t –   W tLt    PW
H,tY t, 
using equation (21), the expected return on capital, acquired at the beginning 
of period t over the period is given by
(20)  Et(1   Rt
k)   
(PW
H,t/P t) (Y t/Kt)   (1    )Et[Qt 1]
    
Qt
,
where   is the depreciation rate of capital. This expected return must be 
equated with the expected cost of funds over [t, t   1], taking into account 
credit market frictions. Wholesale ﬁ  rms borrow in both home and foreign 
currency, with proportion of the former given by ϕ ∈ [0, 1], so that this 
expected cost is
(21) (1     t)ϕEt (1   Rn,t)
P t  







RERt 1  
RERt
  (1    t)ϕEt[(1   Rt)]   (1   ϕ)Et (1   Rt∗)
RERt 1  
RERt .
3. Following Gilchrist, Hairault, and Kempf (2002) and Gilchrist (2003), we ignore the 
managerial input into the production process and later, consistent with this, we ignore the 
contribution of the managerial wage in her net worth.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 5 9
If ϕ   1 or if UIP holds, this becomes (1    t)Et[1   Rt]. In (23), RERt  
Pt∗St/P t is the real exchange rate, Rt– 1  [(1   Rn,t– 1)(P t– 1/P t)] –   1 is the ex post 
real interest rate over [t –   1, t] and  t   0 is the external ﬁ  nance premium 
given by
(22)   t    
Bt  
Nt;   ( )   0,  (0)   0,  ( )    ,
where Bt   QtKt –   Nt is bond-  ﬁ  nanced acquisition of capital in period t 
and Nt is the beginning-  of-  period t entrepreneurial net worth, the equity 
of the ﬁ  rm. Note that the ex post return at the beginning of period t, Rk
t– 1, 
is given by
(23) 1    Rk
t 1   
(PW
H,t 1/P t 1) (Y t 1/Kt 1)   (1    )Qt     
Qt 1
,
and this can deviate from the ex-  ante return on capital.
Assuming that entrepreneurs exit with a given probability 1 –  ξe, net worth 
accumulates according to
(24)  Nt   ξeV t,
where V t the net value carried over from the previous period is given by
(25)  V t    (1   Rk
t 1)Qt 1Kt 1   (1    t 1)
  ϕ(1   Rt 1)   (1   ϕ)(1   R∗
t 1)
RERt  
RERt 1(Qt 1Kt 1   Nt 1).
Note that in (27), (1   Rk
t– 1) is the ex post return on capital acquired at the 
beginning of period t –   1, (1   Rt– 1) is the ex post real cost of borrowing in 
home currency, and (1   R∗
t– 1)RERt/RERt– 1 is the ex post real cost of bor-
rowing in foreign currency. Also note that net worth Nt at the beginning of 
period t is a nonpredetermined variable since the ex post return depends on 
the current market value Qt, itself a nonpredetermined variable.
Exiting entrepreneurs consume Ct
e, the remaining resources, given by
(26)  Ct
e   (1   ξe)V t,
of which consumption of the domestic good, as in equation (8), is given by
(27)  Ce
H,t   w






Retail ﬁ  rms are monopolistically competitive, buying wholesale goods 
and diﬀerentiating the product at a ﬁ  xed resource cost F. In a free-  entry 
equilibrium proﬁ  ts are driven to zero. Retail output for ﬁ  rm f is then Y t(f) 
  Yt
W(f) –  F  where Yt
W is produced according to production technology (18). 260    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
Retail ﬁ  rms set prices of diﬀerentiated goods according to the following. 
Assume that there is a probability of 1 –   ξH at each period that the price of 
each good f is set optimally to P ˆ
H,t(f). If the price is not reoptimized, then 
it is held constant.4 For each producer f the objective at time t is to choose 
P ˆ





HDt,t kY t k(f)[P ˆ
H,t(f)   P H,t kMCt k],
where Dt,t k is the discount factor over the interval [t, t   k], subject to a 
common5 downward sloping demand from domestic consumers and foreign 
importers of elasticity ζ as in (7), and MCt   PW
H,t/P H,t are marginal costs. 
The solution to this is




HDt,t kY t k(f)[P ˆ
Ht(f)   
ζ
 
(ζ   1)
P H,t kMCt k]   0,
and by the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
(29)  P Ht , +
−
1
1     ξH(P H,t)1 ζ   (1   ξH)(P ˆ
H,t 1(f))1 ζ.
Capital Producers
As in Smets and Wouters (2003), we introduce the delayed response of 
investment observed in the data. Capital producers combine existing capital, 
Kt, leased from the entrepreneurs to transform an input It, gross investment, 
into new capital according to
(30)  Kt 1   (1    )Kt   (1   S(Xt))It; S , S    0; S(1)   S (1)   0,
where Xt  It/(It– 1). This captures the ideas that adjustment costs are associ-
ated with changes rather than levels of investment.6 Gross investment con-
sists of domestic and foreign ﬁ  nal goods
(31)  It   [wI
1/ IIH,t
( I 1)/ I   (1   wI)1/ IIF,t
( I 1)/ I] I/(1  I),
where weights in investment are deﬁ  ned as in the consumption baskets; 
namely
wI   1   (1   n)(1    I); wI∗   1   n(1    I∗),
with investment price given by
(32)  P I,t   [wI(P H,t)1  I   (1   wI)(P F,t)1  I]1/(1  I).
4. Thus, we can interpret 1/(1 –  ξH) as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
5. Recall that we have imposed a symmetry condition ζ   ζ∗ at this point; that is, the elas-
ticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods produced in any one bloc is the same for 
consumers in both blocs.
6. In a balanced growth steady-  state adjustment, costs are associated with change relative 
to trend so that the conditions on S( ) along the balanced growth path become S(1   g)   
S (1   g)   0.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 6 1
Capital producers choose the optimal combination of domestic and foreign 
inputs according to the same form of intratemporal ﬁ  rst-  order conditions 
as for consumption:
(33)  IH,t   wI
P H,t  
P I,t
  IIt;  IF,t   (1   wI)
P F,t  
P I,t
  IIt.





∑ D0,tQt(1   S(Xt))It   
P I,tIt  
P t ,
which, with Xt  It/(It– 1), results in the ﬁ  rst-  order condition
(34)  Qt(1   S(Xt)   XtS (Xt))   Et
1
  
(1   Rt 1)
Qt 1S (Xt)
I2
t 1  
It
2   
P I,t  
P t
.
5.2.3      The Equilibrium, Fiscal Policy, and Foreign Asset Accumulation
In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets, and the bond market are 
all clear. Equating the supply and demand of the home consumer good and 
assuming that government expenditure, taken as exogenous, goes exclusively 
on home goods, we obtain8
Y t   CH,t   Ce
H,t   IH,t   




H,t   Ce∗
H,t   I∗
H,t]   Gt.
Fiscal policy is rudimentary: a balanced government budget constraint 
is given by
(35)  P H,tGt   Tt   MH,t   MH,t 1.
Adjustments to the taxes, T t, in response to shocks to government spending 
away from the steady state are assumed to be nondistortionary.
Let ∑ 
h 1 BF,t(h)    BF,t be the net holdings by the household sector of 
foreign bonds. Summing over the household budget constraints (including 
entrepreneurs and capital producers), noting that net holdings of domestic 
bonds are zero (since home bonds are not held by foreign households), and 
subtracting (39), we arrive at the accumulation of net foreign assets:
(36)  P∗
B,tStBF,t   StMF,t   StBF,t 1   StMF,t 1   W tLt     t   (1   ξe)P tV t 
  P tQt(1   S(Xt))It   P tCt   P tCt
e   P I,tIt   P H,tGt
 StBF,t 1   StMF,t 1   TBt,
where the trade balance, TBt, is given by the national accounting identity
7. This ignores leasing costs, which Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003) show to be of 
second- order  importance.
8. Note that all aggregates, Y t, CH,t, and so forth are expressed in per capita (household) terms.262    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
(37)  P H,tY t   P tCt   P tCt
e   P I,tIt   P H,tGt   TBt.
This completes the model. Given nominal interest rates Rn,t, R∗
n,t, the 
money supply is ﬁ  xed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. 
By Walras’ Law we can dispense with the bond market equilibrium condi-
tion. Then the equilibrium is deﬁ  ned at t   0 as stochastic sequences Ct, Ct
e, 
CH,t, CF,t, P H,t, P F,t, P t, MH,t, MF,t, BH,t, BF,t, W t, Y t, Lt, P0
H,t, Pt
I, Kt, It, Qt, V t; 
foreign counterparts Ct∗, and so forth, RERt, and St, given the monetary 
instruments Rn,t, R∗
n,t, and exogenous processes.
5.2.4      Specialization of the Household’s Utility Function
The choice of utility function must achieve two objectives. The ﬁ  rst, as in 
Felices and Tuesta (2006), is to provide a channel by which dollarization af-
fects the marginal utility of consumption. This is achieved by a utility func-
tion that is nonseparable in consumption and money balances. The second 
objective is to have a model consistent with the balanced growth path (BGP) 
set out in previous sections. As pointed out in Barro and Sala-  i-  Martin 
(2004, chapter 9), this requires a careful choice of the form of the utility as 
a function of consumption and labor eﬀort. Again, as in Gertler, Gilchrist, 
and Natalucci (2003), it is achieved by a utility function that is nonseparable, 
this time in the latter two arguments.
A utility function of the form
(38)  U  
(εt   1)[ (h)1  (1   Lt(h)(1   εL,t)) ]1  
     
1    
where
(39)   t(h)  [b(Ct(h)   hCCt 1)(  1)/    (1   b)Zt(h)(  1)/ ] /(  1)
(40)  Zt(h)  
a
(εMH,t   1)MH,t(h)
  
P t 
( M 1)/ M   (1   a)
(εMF,t   1)StMF,t(h)
  
P t 
( M 1)/ M
 M/( M 1)
,
and where labor supply, Lt(h), measured as a proportion of a day, normal-
ized at unity, satisﬁ  es these two requirements.9 For this function, U L   0, 
so that consumption and money holdings together, and leisure (equal to 
1 –   Lt[h]) are substitutes.
5.2.5    State  Space  Representation
We linearize around a deterministic zero inﬂ  ation, balanced growth steady 
state. We can write the two-  bloc model in state space form as
9. A balanced growth path (BGP) requires that the real wage, real money balances, and con-
sumption grow at the same rate at the steady state with labor supply steady. It is straightforward 
to show that (42) has these properties.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 6 3
(41)  
zt 1
Etxt 1   A
zt
xt   Bot   C
rn,t
r∗
n,t   Dvt 1
 o    H
zt




where zt is a vector of predetermined exogenous variables, xt are nonpre-
determined variables, and ot is a vector of outputs.10 Matrices A, B, and so 
forth are functions of model parameters. Rational expectations are formed 
assuming an information set {z1,s, z2,s, xs}, s   t, the model and the monetary 
rule. Details of the linearization are provided in appendix B.
5.2.6      The Small Open Economy
Following Felices and Tuesta (2006), we can now model a small open 
economy by letting its relative size in the world economy n → 0 while retain-
ing its linkages with the rest of the world (ROW). In particular, the demand 
for exports is modeled in a consistent way that retains its dependence on 
shocks to the home and ROW economies. We now need a fully articulated 
model of the ROW. From (6) we have that w →   and w∗ → 1 as n → 0. 
Similarly, for investment we have wI →  I and wI∗ → 1 as n → 0. It seems at 
ﬁ  rst glance then that the ROW becomes closed and therefore exports from 
our small open economy must be zero. However, this is not the case. Con-
sider the linearized form of the output demand equations in the two blocs:
(42)  yt    C,Hct    e
C,Hct
e    ∗
C,Hct ∗    I,Hit    ∗
I,Hit∗    Ggt
  [ ( C,H    e
C,H)(1   w)    ∗ ∗
C,Hw∗    I I,H(1   wI)    I ∗ ∗
I,HwI∗] t
(43)  yt∗    ∗
C,Fct∗    C,Fct    e
C,Fct
e    ∗
I,Fit∗    I,Fit    ∗
Ggt∗
  [ ∗( ∗
C,F(1   w∗)     C,Fw    I ∗ ∗
I,F(1   wI∗)    I I,FwI] t,
where the elasticities and their limits as n → 0 are given by
   C,H   




 (1   se)C
  
Y
   e








   ∗
C,H   
(1   w∗)C∗
  
Y∗  














10. We deﬁ  ne all lowercase variables as proportional deviations from this baseline steady 
state except for rates of change, which are absolute deviations. That is, for a typical variable 
Xt, xt   Xt –   X/X 	 log (Xt/X), where X is the baseline steady state. For variables expressing a 
rate of change over time such as the nominal interest rate rn,t and inﬂ  ation rates, xt   Xt –   X.264    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
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I,H   
(1   wI∗)I∗
  
Y∗  










   ∗
C,F   
w∗C∗
 




   e∗
C,F   0
   C,F   






(1   n)Y∗  → 0
   e
C,F   





(1   n)Y∗  → 0
   ∗




   ∗
I,F   
wI∗I∗
 




   I,F   





(1   n)Y∗  → 0.
Thus, we see that from the viewpoint of the ROW our small open economy 
becomes invisible, but not vice versa. Exports to and imports from the ROW 
are now modeled explicitly in a way that captures all the interactions between 
shocks in the ROW and the transmission to the small open economy.
5.2.7    Calibration
Home Bias Parameters
The bias parameters we need to calibrate are:  ,  ∗,  I, and  I∗. Let in 
the steady state Ce   seC be consumption by entrepreneurs, and cy   C/Y. 
Let csimports be the GDP share of imported consumption of the foreign (F) 
consumption good. Let csexports be the GDP share of exports of the home 
(H) consumption good. Then we have that
   C,H   
CH  
Y




   (cy   csimports)(1   se)
   e








   (cy   csimports)se
   ∗
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Similarly, for investment deﬁ  ne isimports to be the GDP share of imported 
investment of the F investment and isexports be the GDP share of exports of 
H investment good. Then with iy   I/Y, we have
   I,H   
IH  
Y




   iy   isimports
   ∗




   






   isexports
in the steady state. We linearize around a zero trade balance TB   0, so we 
require
(44)  csimports   isimports   csexports   isexports
in which case  C,H    e
C,H    ∗
C,H    I,H    ∗
I,H   cy   iy, as required. Thus, 
we can use trade data for consumption and investment goods, consumption 
shares, and relative per capita GDP to calibrate the bias parameters  ,  ∗, 
 I, and  I ∗. We need the home country biases elsewhere in the model, but 
for the ROW we simply put  ∗    I ∗   1 everywhere else, so these biases 
are not required as such.
Calibration of Household Preference Parameters
We now show how observed data on the household wage bill as a propor-
tion of total consumption, real money balances as a proportion of consump-
tion, and estimates of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption 
with respect to total money balances can be used to calibrate the preference 
parameters  , b, and   in (42).
Calibrating parameters to the BG steady state, we ﬁ  rst note that from 
(16) we have
(45) 




W(1   L)
  
PC
   
  
   
C(1   hC) C(1    )
.
In (49), W(1 –  L)/PC is the household wage bill as a proportion of total con-





   




where cz  (C(1 –   hC))/Z is the eﬀective- consumption– real  money  balance 
ratio (allowing for external habit). From (42), the elasticity the marginal util-




      
(1   b)[(1    )(1    )   1   (1/ )]
    
bcz(  1)/    1   b
.
From the ﬁ  rst-  order conditions in the steady state (A.26) and (A.27) with 
Rn   R∗
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(48) 
b(1   hC)
  
1   b
 cz 1/    




Thus, given  ,  , g, hC, (W(1 –   L))/PC, cz, and  , equations (49) through 
(52) can be solved for  , b, and  . Appendix C provides further details11 of 
  ∈ [0, 0.01]. Since     0, we impose on our calibration the property that 
money and consumption are complements.
Remaining Parameters
As far as possible, parameters are chosen based on quarterly data for 
Peru. Elsewhere the parameters reﬂ  ect broad characteristics of emerging 
economies. A variety of sources are used: for Peru we draw upon Castillo, 
Montoro, and Tuesta (2006) (henceforth, CMT). For emerging economies 
more generally and for parameters related to the ﬁ  nancial accelerator we use 
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003) (henceforth, GGN) and Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) (henceforth, BGG). The rest of the world is 
represented by U.S. data. Here we draw upon Levin et al. (2006) (henceforth, 
LOWW). In places, we match Peru with European estimates using Smets 
and Wouters (2003) (henceforth, SW). Appendix C provides full details of 
the calibration.
5.3      Monetary Policy Interest Rate Rules
In line with the literature on open economy interest rate rules (see, for ex-
ample, Benigno and Benigno [2004]), we assume that the central bank in the 
emerging market bloc has three options: (a) set the nominal interest to keep 
the exchange rate ﬁ  xed (ﬁ  xed exchange rates, “FIX”); (b) set the interest rate 
to minimize deviations of domestic or CPI inﬂ  ation from a predetermined 
target (inﬂ  ation targeting under fully ﬂ  exible exchange rates, “FLEX(D)” 
or “FLEX(C)”); or ﬁ  nally, (c) follow a hybrid regime, in which the nominal 
interest rates respond to both inﬂ  ation deviations from target and exchange 
rate deviations from a certain level (managed ﬂ  oat, “HYB”). Many emerging 
market countries follow one or another of these options and most are likely 
to in the near future. Formally, the rules are as follows.
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime, “FIX”  In a simpliﬁ  ed model without an 
exchange rate premium as analyzed in section 5.4, we show this is imple-
mented by
(49)  rn,t   r∗
n,t    sst,
where any  s   0 is suﬃcient to the regime. In our full model with an exchange 
rate premium, we implement “FIX” as a “HYB” regime following, with feed-
11. See Woodford (2003, chapter 2) for a discussion of this parameter.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 6 7
back coeﬃcients chosen to minimize a loss function that includes a large 
penalty on exchange rate variability. (Note that values for the loss function 
reported shown in the following remove the latter contribution.)
Inﬂ  ation Targets under a Fully Flexible Exchange Rate, “FLEX(D)” or 
“FLEX(C)”  This takes the form of Taylor rule with domestic or CPI 
inﬂ  ation and output growth targets:
(50)  rn,t    rn,t 1     Et H,t    y yt
(51)  rn,t    rn,t 1     Et t    y yt,
where   ∈ [0, 1] is an interest rate smoothing parameter.
Managed Float, “HYB”  In this rule the exchange rate response is direct 
rather than indirect as in the CPI inﬂ  ation rule (55):12
(52)  rn,t    rn,t 1     Et H,t    y yt    sst.
In all cases we assume that the central bank in the emerging market bloc 
enjoys full credibility. Although this assumption may have been considered 
heroic a few years ago, today there are several emerging market countries that 
have succeeded in stabilizing inﬂ  ation at low levels and have won the trust of 
economic agents at home and abroad including economies with a history of 
high or hyper- inﬂ  ation (e.g., Brazil, Israel, Peru, and Mexico, among others. 
See Batini, Breuer, and Kochhar [2006]). Accounting for imperfect credibil-
ity of the central bank remains nonetheless important for many other emerg-
ing market countries, and can lead to higher stabilization costs than under 
full credibility (under inﬂ  ation targeting and ﬂ  oating exchange rate, see Aoki 
and Kimura [2007]) or even sudden stops and ﬁ  nancial crises (under ﬁ  xed 
exchange rates, see IMF [2005]).
5.4      Transactions Dollarization in a Model without Capital
The stability and determinacy properties of various monetary rules pro-
vide a good indication of their stabilization performance. However, the full 
model with capital, the ﬁ  nancial accelerator, and both transactions and 
liability dollarization has high-  order dynamics and is not analytically trac-
table. In order to throw some light on the numerical results that follow, in 
12. Rule (52) describes one of many possible speciﬁ  cations of a managed ﬂ  oat, namely one 
where the central bank resists deviations of the exchange rate from a certain level—considered 
to be the equilibrium—as well as deviations of inﬂ  ation from target and output from potential. 
An equally plausible speciﬁ  cation involves a feedback on the rate of change of the exchange 
rate, in which case the central bank aim is to stabilize exchange rate volatility; that is, the pace 
at which the domestic currency appreciates or depreciates over time. For a discussion see Batini, 
Harrison, and Millard (2003). To limit the number of simulations and results to be compared, 
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this section we therefore study a special case of the model that suppresses 
capital, the associated ﬁ  nancial accelerator, habit in consumption, and the 
exchange rate risk premium facing households (i.e., hC    r   0). The anal-
ysis provides results on the consequences of transactions dollarization for a 
simple current domestic inﬂ  ation targeting rule in the form (54) with  y   0.
We are interested in establishing the conditions for this current domestic 
inﬂ  ation rule to be saddle-  path stable. Exogenous processes play no part in 
this property (so long as they themselves are stable or saddle-  path stable, a 
property we assume). Ignoring these processes we can express the linearized 
system in terms of the marginal utilities of consumption, uc,t in deviation 
form,13 and the marginal disutility of labor (ul,t), which holds for any choice 
of utility function. After some eﬀort this takes the form
(53)  Etuc,t 1   uc,t    (rn,t   Et H,t 1)





(55)  yt   lt    C,Hct    uc,t,
where  H   ((1 –   ξH)(1 –  ξH))/ξH and     1/ (  C,H(1 –   )    ∗ ∗
C,H). After 
further algebra, using the expressions for uc,t, ul,t, yt, ct in appendix B, we 
arrive at the following speciﬁ  cation for  H,t expressed solely in terms of uc,t 
and rn,t:
 Et H,t 1    H,t    uc,t   κrn,t,
where
     H
L
 
1   L
 
1    
 
 
   
L
 
1   L
 
  
(1   (L/1 L) cy)(1    )[ (  1)L]/(1 L)
     
1   (    1)(1    )    (    1) cy(L/1 L)
κ   a 
 HϖL   
a 
 H(1   (L/1 L) cy)ϖ
     
1   (    1)(1    )    (    1) cy(L/1 L)
,
and ϖ, ϖL, b1, a 
 aand   are deﬁ  ned in appendix B.
We restrict ourselves to a range of parameter values for which     1 and 
(1 –    ) –     cyL/(1 –   L)   0. Because  cy L/(1 –   L),     1 this is a very weak 
condition that our calibrated values easily satisfy. Then     0. Furthermore, 
κ can be either positive or negative. By deﬁ  nition ϖL, the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of work eﬀort with respect to the nominal interest rate is 
13. Recall that all lower case variables are proportional deviations from the steady state, 
except for rates of change, which are absolute deviations. See note 12.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 6 9
always positive. But the sign of ϖ, the corresponding elasticity of the mar-
ginal utility of consumption, depends on whether consumption and real 
balances are substitutes or complements. If they are substitutes then ϖ   
0 and then κ   0. But here we assume that they are complements, in which 
case κ can take either sign. Our results following are sensitive to this.
In fact, for our chosen calibration, κ is comfortably positive. This means 
that the nominal interest rate impacts on the economy through two chan-
nels. First, given expectations of CPI inﬂ  ation, an increase in the nominal 
interest rate reduces the expected real interest rate and reduces demand from 
consumption. This will cause the domestic inﬂ  ation rate to fall in the usual 
way. But with a nonseparable utility function, there is a second channel of 
inﬂ  uence through the supply-  side that sees marginal cost, and therefore the 
inﬂ  ation rate, rise as the result of an increase in the interest rate. Thus, with 
κ   0 supply and demand eﬀects work in opposite directions and the supply 
side eﬀect will tend to undermine the stabilizing demand side eﬀect. However, 
κ depends on the degree of transactions dollarization, κ   0, when there 
is complete dollarization (a   a 
   0) and therefore the supply eﬀect closes 
down. This eliminates a destabilizing eﬀect, so as we approach complete 
transactions dollarization we should witness a more eﬀective form of mon-
etary stabilization.
Equations (57) and (60) form the basis for the analysis of the next section. 
The important feature of the modiﬁ  ed Phillips curve, (60), with a nonsepa-
rable utility function in money and consumption, is the manner in which the 
domestic interest rate impacts on domestic inﬂ  ation.
5.4.1      Fixed Exchange Rate Regime (FIX)
For the model without capital and an exchange rate risk premium, the 
saddle-  path stability of the FIX regime is unambiguous as the following 
proposition indicates:
Proposition 1. Under regime FIX:
(a) The system is stable and determinate for all values of  s   0.
(b) The nominal exchange rate is ﬁ  xed.
PROOF. See appendix D.
As Benigno and Benigno (2004) have stressed, the feedback from the 
exchange rate to the interest rate is not operative in the equilibrium because 
st   0 at all times. Rather, it is the belief that the monetary authority responds 
in this way even for very small  s that maintains a ﬁ  xed exchange rate. With 
such a regime, the domestic interest rate that enters the Phillips curve in (60) 
remains ﬁ  xed too, so neither the nonseparable form of the utility function 
nor the existence of dollarization has an impact on the stability properties 
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5.4.2    Domestic  Inﬂ  ation Targeting Rule (FLEX (D))
Now consider the rule (54). In the rest of this section we focus on inﬂ  ation- 
targeting interest rate rules that respond only to domestic inﬂ  ation, but not 
to output growth. This makes the analysis tractable, but there are other 
reasons for examining such rules. First, pure inﬂ  ation- targeting or inﬂ  ation- 
targeting with a managed exchange rate corresponds to the objectives of 
many modern central banks. Second, it is of intrinsic interest to see to what 
extent an economy can be stabilized with the simplest possible form of rule 
that only tracks one nominal variable. With this form of rule we can then 
show the following.
PROPOSITION 2. Under FLEX (D):
(a) If 2κ        (1 –    )κ, then the system is stable and determinate for 
the range 1        ((1    )(2(1    )     ))/((1 –    )(2κ –     )) !   
 .
(b) If      2κ, then any feedback      1 from current inﬂ  ation leads to 
stability and determinacy.
Proof. See appendix D. An immediate corollary follows.
Corollary 1. As   → 1 and we approach an integral rule, then the range 
[1,   
 ] in (a) becomes inﬁ  nite.
Thus, interest rate smoothing helps to induce determinacy—a result 
obtained in Batini, Levine, and Pearlman (2004) for both current and 
forward- looking  inﬂ  ation targeting rules. Furthermore, we show in appen-
dix D that κ decreases with increasing dollarization in the range 0   a   1/2, 
which leads to another corollary.
COROLLARY 2. For high levels of dollarization a   1/2, as dollarization 
increases further, then κ falls and the determinacy range for    increases.
Thus, for a current domestic inﬂ  ation rule, a high degree of transactions dol-
larization poses no problems for stability and determinacy; in fact, it helps 
to avoid both problems. The intuition behind this result is that with κ   0, 
a case easily supported by the calibration, supply and demand eﬀects of 
nominal interest rate changes operate in opposite directions. But transac-
tions dollarization closes down the supply-  side eﬀect and therefore helps 
the stabilization process.
Figure 5.1 illustrates our result using our central calibration. We see that 
condition (a) is just satisﬁ  ed for all degrees of transactions dollarization, 
a ∈ [0, 1], if     0.25, which is a very modest degree of interest rate smooth-
ing. These results have been obtained for a simple model where many of 
the features in our full model have been suppressed. Nevertheless, they are 
suggestive of the eﬀects of transactions dollarization on the stabilization 
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5.5      Optimal Monetary Policy, Volatility, and Impulse Responses
How do ﬁ  nancial frictions and dollarization in emerging market econo-
mies aﬀect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the volatili-
ties of output, inﬂ  ation, and other key variables? To answer this question 
we do two things. First, we parameterize four representations of the model 
with increasing frictions and dollarization, and solve them subject to the cor-
responding optimal monetary policy rule based on maximizing the house-
hold’s utility. (Later, in section 5.6, this provides a benchmark against which 
to assess the welfare implications of the ﬁ  xed exchange rate regime and 
various Taylor- type ﬂ  exible exchange rate rules.) We then compare the vola-
tilities delivered by each model for key macrovariables, including inﬂ  ation 
and output. Second, we analyze how transmission of shocks is aﬀected by 
frictions and dollarization by tracing impulse responses to two key shocks.
5.5.1      Optimal Monetary Policy and Volatilities
We adopt a linear- quadratic framework for the optimization problem fac-
ing the monetary authority. This is particularly convenient as we can then 
summarize outcomes in terms of unconditional (asymptotic) variances of 
macroeconomic variables and the local stability and determinacy of par-
ticular rules. The framework also proves useful for addressing the issue of 
the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
Following Woodford (2003), we adopt a “small distortions” quadratic 
approximation to the household’s single period utility that is accurate as long 
as the zero-  inﬂ  ation steady state is close to the social optimum. There are 
three distortions that result in the steady- state output being below the social 
optimum: namely, output and labor market distortions from monopolistic 
competition and distortionary taxes required to pay for government pro-
vided services. Given our calibration these features would make our distor-
tions far from small. However, there is a further distortion, external habit in 
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consumption, that in itself raises the equilibrium steady-  state output above 
the social optimum. If the habit parameter hC is large enough, the two sets of 
eﬀects can cancel out and thus justify our small distortions approximation. 
In fact, this is the case in our calibration.14
From appendix E our quadratic approximation to the household’s inter-
temporal expected loss function is given by





(57) 2Lt   wc
ct  hCct 1   
1   hC 
2
   w  t
2   w cl
ct   hCct 1   
1   hC lt   wllt
2
  wk(kt 1   lt)2   w ayytat   w circit t   w cls clst t   w  2
H,t
 cit    (1    )cyct    (1    ∗)cyct ∗    I I(1    I)iyit    I ∗(1    I ∗)iyit∗
 clst  [(1    )(1    )   1]
ct∗   hc∗
t 1   
1   h
   (1    ) 
L∗lt∗
 
1   L∗ ,
and the weights w c, w , and so forth, are deﬁ  ned in appendix E. Thus, from 
(62) welfare is reduced as a result of volatility in consumption adjusted 
to external habit ct –   hCct– 1; the terms of trade  t, labor supply lt, domestic 
inﬂ  ation  H,t, and foreign shocks. There are also some covariances that arise 
from the procedure for the quadratic approximation of the loss function. 
The policymaker’s problem at time t   0 is then to minimize (61) subject 
to the model in linear state-  space form given by (45), initial conditions on 
predetermined variables z0, and the Taylor rule followed by the ROW. Details 
of the optimization procedure are provided in Levine, McAdam, and Pearl-
man (2007).
We parameterize the model according to ﬁ  ve alternatives, ordered by 
increasing degrees of frictions and dollarization:
•    Model I: no transaction dollarization, no ﬁ  nancial accelerator, and no 
liability dollarization. This is a fairly standard small open economy 
model similar to many in the new-  Keynesian open economy literature 
with the only nonstandard features being a nonseparable utility func-
tion in money balances, consumption, and leisure consistent with a 
balanced growth path and a fully articulated ROW bloc.
•   Model II: transaction dollarization (TD) only (where the degree of TD 
is captured by 1 –   a, where a ∈ [0, 1]).
•    Model III: ﬁ  nancial accelerator (FA) only.
14. See Levine, McAdam, and Pearlman (2007) and Levine, Pearlman, and Pierse (2006) 
for a discussion of these issues. The former paper provides details of all the optimization 
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•    Model IV: ﬁ  nancial accelerator (FA) and liability dollarization (LD), 
assuming that ﬁ  rms borrow a fraction of their ﬁ  nancing requirements 
1 –   ϕ ∈ [0, 1] in dollars.
•   Model V: TD plus FA plus LD, where a   ϕ   0.5; that is, medium 
level TD and LD.
We subject all these variants of the model to six exogenous and inde-
pendent shocks. Three of these—total factor productivity (at), government 
spending (gt), and the external risk premium facing ﬁ  rms,  P,t—are domestic 
and three—a foreign demand counterpart to gt∗, a country risk premium 
shock to the modiﬁ  ed UIP condition,  UIP,t, and shock to the foreign interest 
rate rule  ∗
R,t—originate from the ROW. The foreign bloc is fully articulated, 
so the eﬀect of these shocks impacts on the domestic economy through 
changes in the demand for exports. Since the domestic economy is small, 
however, there is no corresponding eﬀect of domestic shocks on the ROW.15
The ﬁ  rst question we pose is what is the relative importance of these six 
shocks for the welfare of domestic households under optimal monetary 
policy? Table 5.1 provides the answer by carrying out an expected welfare 
decomposition16 with respect to the shocks for our four model variants. For 
both TD and LD we assume a degree of dollarization 1 –   a   1 –   ϕ   0.5. 
Given our calibration, the most important shock is that to technology, irre-
spective of the existence of a FA or LD. But as these latter features are 
introduced in turn, the model economy becomes increasingly vulnerable to 
the three foreign shocks, with the contribution of technology falling from 
82 percent in model I to 44 percent in model IV. Our earlier analysis of a 
model without capital suggested that TD improves stabilization. Table 5.1 
conﬁ  rms this for the full model—indeed, TD sees a reduction in the welfare 
loss emanating from all shocks.
15. Of course, the simulation results reported in the following depend on our calibration 
of both structural parameters and shocks, particularly on the parameters determining the 
exchange rate elasticity of trade and net worth. However, changing these with a plausible range 
does not aﬀect the results qualitatively.
16. The expected welfare loss is the conditional loss in the vicinity of the steady state.
Table 5.1   Expected welfare loss decomposition
    I   II (a   0.5)  III   IV (ϕ   0.5)
at 0.8100 0.7779 0.6642 0.6980
gt 0.0438 0.0416 0.0417 0.0475
gt∗ 0.0010 0.0001 0.0046 0.0046
 UIP,t 0.0567 0.0520 0.0884 0.0863
 ∗
R,t 0.0543 0.0240 0.0681 0.1406
 P,t 0.0196 0.0197 0.1731 0.5970
All shocks  0.9855  0.9152   1.0400  1.5742274    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
Figure 5.2 picks out some key variables and shows standard deviations 
associated with model I, model II with medium and high degrees of TD 
(IIM, IIH), and model III and model IV with low, medium, and high degrees 
of TD (IVL, IVM, IVH) under optimal policy.17 Table 5.2 presents volatility 
results for all model variables. This broadly reaﬃrms the general result that 
more frictions and liability dollarization trigger greater economic volatil-
ity. Investment, net worth, interest rate, and real exchange variability are 
particularly high for even moderate degrees of liability dollarization and 
ﬁ  nancial acceleration, compared to a world without such features.
A number of further features of these volatilities deserve highlighting. 
First consider TD proceeding from the baseline model with no TD to the 
opposite extreme of full TD. As mentioned previously, welfare does not 
deteriorate but indeed increases, and this is conﬁ  rmed by the reduction in 
variances of consumption, the terms of trade (implied by the lower variance 
of the real exchange rate), and inﬂ  ation, which feature in the loss function. 
However, this comes at a cost of an increase in the variance of the nominal 
interest rate since TD closes down one channel for monetary intervention. 
Fig. 5.2    Transactions dollarization and determinacy of current inﬂ  ation rule
17. We do not show model V because adding TD has no visible implications for volatilities 
in the chart.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 7 5
This higher interest rate has implications in terms of the zero lower bound 
(ZLB) constraint, an issue we return to in section 5.7.
Now consider the FA and LD. With the emergence of the FA we see an 
increase in the variances of all variables, which is marked in the case of out-
put and investment. Variances increase further at ﬁ  rst, as LD is introduced, 
but for complete LD, investment and net worth volatility are lower. We 
explore this phenomenon in our following discussion of impulse response 
functions. The combination of the FA and LD is a lethal cocktail for the 
welfare of households. Welfare loss increases sharply for high levels of LD 
with ϕ   0.5. The variance of the nominal interest rate also increases sub-
stantially with further implications for welfare when we impose the ZLB.
To summarize these results:
•   Inﬂ  ation, consumption, and output volatility worsen markedly as ﬁ  nan-
cial frictions in the form of the FA, and eventually LD, are introduced. 
However, TD, even when complete, does not worsen volatility except 
for the nominal interest rate.
•   Full liability dollarization combined with the ﬁ  nancial accelerator leads 
to levels of real and nominal volatility that are several times larger than 
those present in an economy without such features, for the same shocks. 
As a result, the expected welfare loss increases sharply for high levels 
of LD with ϕ   0.5.
•   The central bank is more aggressive in its use of the nominal inter-
est rate with both forms of dollarization. As a result, the variance of 
the nominal interest rate increases, and markedly so for LD. This has 
important further implications for welfare when we impose the interest 
rate zero lower bound.
Table 5.2   Variances in percent2 and expected welfare loss
  I  
II 
(a   0.5) 
II 
(a   0)  III  
IV 
(ϕ   0.75) 
IV 
(ϕ   0.5) 
IV 
(ϕ   0) 
V 
(a   ϕ   0.5)
var(yt) 4.50 4.53 4.31 13.3 13.1 17.5 25.6 17.8
var(ct) 0.89 0.94 0.95 1.36 1.48 2.37 4.23 2.58
var(it) 9.67 9.78 9.72 139 117 138 44.2 135
var(qt
k) 11.9 12.0 11.8 12.8 12.9 13.2 7.66 13.1
var(lt) 0.72 0.58 0.39 1.19 1.22 1.83 30.3 1.61
var(rert) 3.66 3.61 3.54 3.82 4.33 5.89 16.9 5.68
var( H,t) 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 1.59 0.03
var( t) 0.26 0.29 0.42 0.31 0.41 0.63 5.88 0.63
var(rn,t) 1.24 1.37 1.81 1.37 1.93 4.13 19.2 4.17
var(nt) 0 0 0 227 207 274 118 270
var( t) 1.33 1.33 1.33 2.02 2.03 2.19 1.67 2.18
var( yt) 2.08 2.21 2.60 2.47 2.60 3.16 13.31 3.18
 0   0.986  0.915   0.778   1.040  1.156   1.574   19.14   1.466276    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
How do these volatilities match up to data on ﬁ  nancially dollarized econ-
omies? Probably the most deﬁ  nitive and wide-  ranging work on empirical 
issues on dollarization is due to Levy Yeyati (2006), who analyzes a unique 
database. His cross-  sectional time series data reveals a positive correlation 
between dollarization and the standard deviation of growth rates, which is 
a feature of the penultimate row of table 5.2. Without liability dollariza-
tion, devaluations lead to countercyclical behavior and eventually restore 
the economy to equilibrium. In the presence of LD, the balance sheet eﬀect 
ultimately leads to lower borrowing and capital formation, and lower growth 
on average coupled with increased variability.18
5.5.2      Assessing the Impact of Key External and Internal Shocks
In this section we study impulse responses for two selected shocks, which 
our earlier results have shown have important welfare implications: a tech-
nology shock (at) and a shock to the country’s external risk premium,  UIP,t. 
These are shown in ﬁ  gures 5.3 through 5.6, which concentrate on the baseline 
model (no frictions/dollarization) and model variants where dollarization/
frictions are most pernicious (models III and IVH). Although the analysis 
looks similar to Gilchrist (2003), it is in fact quite distinct in that here we are 
interested in comparing the transmission of shocks as frictions and dollar-
ization increase, rather than in comparing the performance of ﬂ  exible versus 
ﬁ  xed exchange rates given frictions and liability dollarization.
To understand how the transmission of the shock changes for diﬀerent 
levels of frictions and dollarization, we need ﬁ  rst to take a step back and 
illustrate some of the mechanisms driving the real exchange rate, and the 
behavior of net worth of the wholesale ﬁ  rms sector.
Movements in the real exchange rate (and the related terms of trade) are 
critical for understanding our results. Linearization of the modiﬁ  ed UIP 
condition (17) gives
(58)  rert   Etrert 1   Et(rt∗   r t)    rbF,t    UIP,t,
Solving (63) forward, in time we see that the real exchange rate is a sum of 
future expected real interest rate diﬀerentials with the ROW plus a term pro-
portional to the sum of future expected net liabilities plus a sum of expected 
future shocks  UIP,t. The real exchange will depreciate (a rise in rert) if the 
sum of expected future interest rate diﬀerentials are positive and/or the sum 
of expected future net liabilities are positive and/or a positive shock to the 
risk premium,  UIP,t occurs.
Also crucial to the understanding of the eﬀects of the FA and LD is the 
behavior of the net worth of the wholesale sector. In linearized form this 
is given by
18. However, Levy Yeyati (2006) is unable to pick up the balance sheet eﬀects from the data.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 7 7
(59)  nt   
ξe  









  [(1   R) t 1   (1    )(ϕr t 1   (1   ϕ)(r∗
t 1   (1   R)(rert   rert 1)],
where the ex ante cost of capital is given by rk
t– 1. In (64) since leverage 
1/nk   1 we can see that net worth increases with the ex post return on capital 
at the beginning of period t, rk
t– 1, and decreases with the risk premium  t– 1 
charged in period t –   1 and the ex post cost of capital in home currency and 
dollars, ϕr t– 1   (1 –   ϕ)(r∗
t– 1   (1   R)(rert –   rert– 1)), noting that (rert –   rert– 1) is 
the real depreciation of the home currency. Starting at the steady state at 
t   0, from (64) at t   1 we have
(60)  n1   
ξe  
1   g(1    )q1   1   
1
 
nk(1    )(1   ϕ)(1   R)rer1.
Thus, net worth falls if Tobin’s Q falls and if some borrowing is in dollars 
(ϕ   1). We see also that a depreciation of the real exchange rate (rer1   0) 
brings about a further drop in net worth. However, an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate (rer1   0) will oﬀset the drop in net worth. Output falls 
through two channels: ﬁ  rst, a drop in Tobin’s Q and a subsequent fall in 
investment demand and, second, through a reduction in consumption by 
entrepreneurs.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Shock
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the transmission channels in the model under 
optimal monetary policy in response to a negative 1 percent shock to total 
factor productivity. Because TD does not result in big diﬀerences in volatili-
ties, we focus on only three variants: the baseline model with no TD nor FA, 
the model with a FA, and the model with both the FA and a high degree of 
LD. For all three models we have the following broad features: the shocks 
result in an immediate fall in consumption, output, and investment, a tight-
ening of optimal monetary policy with a rise in the nominal and expected 
real interest rate, an appreciation of the real exchange rate (rert falls), a fall 
in the terms of trade ( pF,t –   pH,t    t   rert/ ), a trade deﬁ  cit, and a decline in 
net future assets. Investment falls because Tobin’s Q (deﬁ  ned in the graphs 
as the real market price of capital relative to the price of capital goods, 
qt
k   qt –   pI,t   pt) falls, which in turn responds to an anticipated future fall in 
proﬁ  ts relative to the cost of capital. With the FA switched on, the fall in Tobin’s 
Q measured relative to the price of capital relative to the consumption good, qt, 
causes net worth to fall, which in turn causes the external ﬁ  nancing premium 
facing ﬁ  rms,  t, to rise. This exacerbates the increase in the cost of capital and 
Tobin’s Q, and therefore investment, falls further. This is the familiar eﬀect 
of a FA highlighted, for example, in Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003).278    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
Now consider the FA plus LD where for the graphs we assume all bor-
rowing by ﬁ  rms is in dollars (ϕ   0). In this case, net worth and investment 
fall by far less, and net worth relative to the value of capital hardly changes, 
as can be seen from movements in the external risk premium. Why is this? 
The reason is the appreciation of the exchange rate which (from [65] with 
ϕ   1) oﬀsets the fall in net worth brought about by the fall in Tobin’s 
Q. The policymaker responds to this by tightening more monetary condi-
Fig. 5.3    Responses to a technology shock under optimal monetary policyMonetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 7 9
tions, so that the expected real interest rate rises relative to what happens 
in a model without LD. Thus, the presence of LD induces a stronger mon-
etary intervention particularly in the short run. Another way to explain this 
is by saying that monetary policy is less eﬀective under LD, other things 
equal, because the output gap channel of monetary transmission is weaker 
(since borrowing is partly in dollars, and so the cost of capital is less directly 
aﬀected by changes in the interest rate), while the exchange rate channel is 
Fig. 5.4    Responses to a technology shock under optimal monetary policy280    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
stronger (because under LD changes in the exchange rate generate balance 
sheet eﬀects in addition to aﬀecting net trade). As a result, the central bank 
uses the exchange rate more intensely as a stabilizing device, by creating 
domestic relative to abroad interest rate diﬀerentials. For big enough TFP 
shocks, however, use of the exchange rate channel to minimize “ﬁ  nancial- 
accelerated” output ﬂ  uctuations may clash with the objective of keeping 
inﬂ  ation within a certain range. As indicated by the ﬁ  gure, it takes much 
longer for domestic inﬂ  ation to return to target in a model with FA   LD 
than in a model without frictions or dollarization.
Country External Risk Premium Shock
Next, in ﬁ  gures 5.5 and 5.6, we turn to a 1 percent to the domestic coun-
try’s external risk premium  UIPt in (63). Now the real exchange rate depre-
ciates instead of appreciating, as was the case with the technology shock. 
The responses of all three variants of the model are again broadly similar, 
implying a drop in output, consumption, investment, a fall in Tobin’s Q, a 
tightening of monetary policy, and a fall in net worth. The real deprecia-
tion of the exchange rate leads to a trade surplus and an accumulation of 
foreign assets. The eﬀect of the FA on net worth, the external risk premium, 
and investment is pretty much the same as for the previous simulations. 
But when we combine the FA with LD an important diﬀerence emerges. 
Since the real exchange rate now depreciates instead of appreciating, the 
initial fall in net worth is exacerbated rather than attenuated by balance 
sheet eﬀects, and the external risk premium rises by more. Monetary policy 
is tightened by more than in the TFP shock case, so the depreciation is 
short-  lived because the interest rate diﬀerential relative to abroad is rap-
idly closed, and is eventually reversed, turning into an appreciation. With 
LD, the appreciation that follows the monetary tightening triggers a fur-
ther balance sheet eﬀect that has the eﬀect of returning net worth back 
to its steady state faster than in the FA without LD. Thus, LD has a long- 
stabilizing eﬀect on movements in net worth. Given that the external risk 
premium also returns faster to its equilibrium, forward-  looking investment 
under LD behaves similarly to investment in the baseline, frictionless model. 
The immediate implication is that output returns faster to potential and 
generally contracts by less under FA   LD than in the baseline model with 
no frictions or in the FA-  only model, a result that contrasts with the ﬁ  nd-
ing in Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003) using simple nonoptimized 
rules. The other key ﬁ  nding is that, once again, although FA and LD imply 
similar responses of investment, LD tends to make monetary policy more 
aggressive. Exactly as in the case of the TFP shock, this is optimal in that—
under LD—the monetary authority can take advantage of the interest rate/
exchange rate UIP channel to aﬀect the exchange rate, and this way bring 
net worth and investment (and hence output and inﬂ  ation) faster back to 
equilibrium.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 8 1
5.6      The Fixed Exchange Rate Regime and Optimal Rules
What is left to understand now is what is hence the optimal degree of 
exchange rate stabilization (given inﬂ  ation stabilization) in economies with 
frictions and dollarization. To this end we proceed to search simple opti-
mized rules that maximize a welfare criterion based on households’ utility 
under ﬁ  nancial frictions and dollarization. We focus on the three regimes 
described previously, namely FIX, FLEX, and HYB. For the latter two 
Fig. 5.5    Responses to a UIP shock under optimal monetary policy282    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
regimes we compute optimized rules that minimize the expected welfare loss 
with respect to the feedback parameters   ∈ [0, 1],   , and  s. We restrict 
our search to    ∈ [1, 5]: the lower bound ensures the rule satisﬁ  es the Tay-
lor principle and the imposed upper bound avoids large initial jumps in the 
nominal interest rate.
We search simple rules that are optimal for four model variants (where 
in model II we set a   1/2; i.e., moderate TD, in model IV we set ϕ   0.75; 
i.e., a moderate LD).
Fig. 5.6    Responses to a UIP shock under optimal monetary policyMonetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 8 3
Table 5.3 provides the parameter values that optimize the FLEX and 
HYB rules in these four cases.19 Tables 5.4 through 5.7 report variances from 
simulating each model variant under all shocks for the corresponding simple 
optimized FIX, FLEX, and HYB rule.20 A joint read of these tables points 
to some interesting results.
•   Responding  directly to the exchange rate, in addition to inﬂ  ation and 
output growth, is not optimal under liability dollarization or in the pres-
ence of ﬁ  nancial frictions (FA in particular): the optimal feedback from 
the exchange rate is zero, or close to zero across all models. Thus, central 
banks in countries with these features should not attempt to manage 
the exchange rate nor, more generally, attempt to balance inﬂ  ation and 
exchange rate stability objectives. This ﬁ  nding restates the Gilchrist 
(2003) result obtained using simple nonoptimized rules. The reason 
is clear: ﬁ  nancial dollarization weakens the output gap channel and 
strengthens the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmis-
sion—which gets activated through the UIP via interest rate changes—
because, in this case, the cost of capital on which output (and inﬂ  ation) 
depend are a function of both the real interest rate and the real exchange 
rate. Because under ﬁ  nancial dollarization exchange rate becomes the 
key adjustment variable, changes in it are necessary to stabilize inﬂ  ation 
by attenuating the ﬁ  nancial accelerator eﬀects. Thus, ﬁ  xing the exchange 
rate or reducing its volatility limits the ability of the central bank to 
enact stabilizing monetary interventions, and forces it to larger interest 
rate gyrations instead. These induce larger welfare losses both because 
the central bank now forgoes the possibility to use the exchange rate to 
Table 5.3   Optimized rules
  Rule             y    s  
FLEX(D): Model I 1.0 5.0 0.32 0
FLEX(C): Model I 1.0 5.0 0.016 0
HYB: Model I 1.0 5.0 0.29 0.025
FLEX(D): Model II 1.0 5.0 0.25 0
FLEX(C): Model II 0.82 5.0 0.016 0
HYB: Model II 1.0 5.0 0.22 0.03
FLEX(D): Model III 0.95 5.0 0.44 0
FLEX(C): Model III 0.62 5.0 0.011 0
HYB: Model III 0.95 5.0 0.44 0
FLEX(D): Model IV 0.91 5.0 0.34 0
FLEX(C): Model IV 0.72 5.0 0.069 0
  HYB: Model IV   0.91  5.0  0.34   0  
19. Note there is no “optimal” FIX regime since the parameter  s is simply set at a value 
suﬃciently high to ensure a ﬁ  xed exchange rate.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0288    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
undo ﬁ  nancial accelerator eﬀects and because aggressive changes in the 
interest rate generate adverse balance sheet eﬀects at home by raising 
strongly the cost of capital, which in turn aﬀects net worth and output.
•   Responding indirectly to the exchange rate by choosing a consumer 
price rather than a domestic price inﬂ  ation target, regime FLEX(C) is 
also severely suboptimal. The reasons for this are broadly the same as 
those for the failure of HYB to improve on FLEX(D).
•   With  ﬂ  exible exchange rates, under FA   LD policy tends to be more 
aggressive, other things equal, with larger gyrations of the interest rate 
than under no frictions/dollarization. Adding an explicit feedback 
response to the exchange rate instills yet additional volatility to the 
interest rate with negative repercussions on all macrovariables (table 
5.7) and a larger welfare loss. In the extreme case of exchange rate ﬁ  xity 
(FIX) results are disastrous.
•    The optimal parameters in our simple rules are similar across models, 
which means that a domestic inﬂ  ation feedback rule with an added feed-
back for output is a robust rule with respect to any model uncertainty 
regarding ﬁ  nancial frictions. Emerging market central banks do not have 
to signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerentiate the way the monetary conditions are set 
from the way these are set in advanced, relatively frictionless economies.
•   Finally, our results indicate that smoothing interest rate changes is desir-
able independently of the frictions/dollarization features of the econ-
omy—and indeed, integral rules always outperform proportional rules.21
Two questions remain. Given that there is little or no scope for targeting 
the nominal exchange rate, what is the welfare cost of maintaining a ﬁ  xed 
rate? Second, the Taylor-  type rules are only optimal given the constraints 
implied by the particular inﬂ  ation and output growth targets, but is subop-
timal compared with the fully optimal commitment rule. What, then, is the 
welfare cost of restricting rules in this way? Tables 5.4 through 5.8 provide 
answers to these questions. These tables provide outcomes in terms of uncon-
ditional variances of key variables where the maximized welfare losses  0 are 
provided and compared with those for the optimal commitment policy. In 
the ﬁ  nal column we provide the percentage consumption equivalent welfare 
loss compared with the optimal policy derived in appendix E and given by22
(61)  ce   
 i
0    0
OPT
  
(1    )(1   hC)cy
   10 2, i   FIX, FLEX(D), FLEX(C).
A number of noteworthy points emerge from these results on welfare 
costs. First, the ﬁ  xed exchange rate constraint imposes a cost in terms of a 
21. As is shown in Batini, Levine, and Pearlman (2004) in an open economy context, interest 
rate smoothing is also desirable because it allows the rule to feedback strongly from the interest 
rate target without falling foul of determinacy.
22. Note that all welfare losses have been normalized by the terms 1 –    /FY—see appendix 
E. In addition, all variances are in percent2, so that ce is in percent form.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 8 9
permanent consumption equivalent of 0.48 through 0.50 percent for mod-
els I and II, rising to 1.25 percent in model IV. The introduction of the FA 
sees these consumption costs increase signiﬁ  cantly and then rise again with 
the introduction of the LD at the moderate level of ϕ   0.75 (meaning a 
quarter of the ﬁ  rms’ borrowing is in dollars). Second, optimized domestic 
inﬂ  ation Taylor-  type rules mimic the fully optimal rule closely with a very 
small consumption equivalent loss. The latter rises with the introduction of 
the FA and again with LD, but remains small. So not only are optimized 
rules of this simple rule robust, they are only slightly suboptimal. Third, CPI 
inﬂ  ation rules, however, impose far higher costs from 0.03 to 0.15 percent as 
one progresses from model I to model IV.
In one respect, the consumption equivalent costs reported up to now are 
misleading, especially for the FIX regime. The reason for this is to be seen 
for the unconditional variances reported in these, which are very large in 
the case of FIX and rise for all regimes when we introduce the FA and then 
LD. Such high variances imply that the interest rate under these optimized 
or optimal rules will hit the interest rate zero lower bound frequently.23 The 
next section addresses this design fault in the rules.
5.7      Imposing the Nominal Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound
We now modify our interest rate rules to approximately impose an interest 
rate ZLB so that this event hardly ever occurs. Although so far only a few 
emerging market countries have experienced deﬂ  ationary episodes (Peru and 
Israel in 2007 are examples of this), most inﬂ  ation targeting emerging mar-
ket countries have chosen low single digit inﬂ  ation targets (see IMF [2005]), 
which makes the design of rules robust to ZLB problems germane. As in 
Woodford (2003, chapter 6), the ZLB constraint is implemented by modify-
ing the single period welfare loss (62) to Lt   wrr2
n,t. Then following Levine, 
McAdam, and Pearlman (2007), the policymaker’s optimization problem is 
to choose wr and the unconditional distribution for rn,t (characterized by the 
steady-  state variance) shifted to the right about a new nonzero steady state 
inﬂ  ation rate and a higher nominal interest rate, such that the probability, p, 
of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is very low. This is implemented 
by calibrating the weight wr for each of our policy rules so that z0(p) r   Rn, 
where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed variable 
Z such that prob (Z   z0)   p, Rn   1/( (1   guc) –  1    ∗ is the steady- state 
nominal interest rate,  r
2   var(rn) is the unconditional variance, and  ∗ is the 
new steady-  state inﬂ  ation rate. Given  r, the steady-  state positive inﬂ  ation 
rate that will ensure rn,t   0 with probability 1 –   p is given by24
23. As Primiceri (2006) has pointed out, optimal rules with this feature are “not operational.”
24. If the ineﬃciency of the steady-  state output is negligible, then  ∗   0 is a credible new 
steady- state  inﬂ  ation rate. Note that in our LQ framework, the zero interest rate bound is very 
occasionally hit. Then, interest rate is allowed to become negative, possibly using a scheme 
proposed by Gesell (1934) and Keynes (1936). Our approach to the ZLB constraint (following 290    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
(62)   ∗   maxz0(p) r   
1
  
 (1   guc)
   1   100, 0.
In our linear quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected 
welfare loss at time t   0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic com-
ponents,  0     ˜
0     
0. Note that   
0 incorporates in principle the new 
steady- state values of all the variables; however, the NK Phillips curve being 
almost vertical, the main extra term comes from the  2 term in equation 
(E.32). By increasing wr we can lower  r, thereby decreasing  ∗ and reducing 
the deterministic component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic 
component of the welfare loss. By exploiting this trade- oﬀ, we then arrive at 
the optimal policy that, in the vicinity of the steady state, imposes the ZLB 
constraint, r t   0, with probability 1 –   p.
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the results of this optimization procedure for the 
optimal commitment rules and the optimized simple rules, respectively, for 
the case of model IV. We choose p   0.001. Given wr, denote the expected 
intertemporal loss (stochastic plus deterministic components) at time t   0 
by  0(wr). This includes a term penalizing the variance of the interest rate 
that does not contribute to utility loss as such, but rather represents the 
interest rate lower bound constraint. Actual utility, found by subtracting 
the interest rate term, is given by  0(0). The steady-  state inﬂ  ation rate,  ∗, 
that will ensure the lower bound is reached only with probability p   0.001, 
and is computed using (67). Given  ∗, we can then evaluate the determin-
istic component of the welfare loss,   
0. Because in the new steady state the 
real interest rate is unchanged, the steady state involving real variables are 
also unchanged, so from (62) we can write   
0(0)   w  ∗2. Both the ex ante 
optimal and the optimal time consistent deterministic welfare loss that guide 
Table 5.8   Optimal commitment with a nominal interest rate ZLB (Model IV with  
 0.75)
wr    r
2     ˜
0(wr)    ˜
0(0)   ∗      
0(0)   0(0)
0 1.93 1.156 1.156 0.46 0.476 1.632
0.1 1.72 1.231 1.160 0.22 0.109 1.269
0.2 1.58 1.300 1.169 0.06 0.008 1.177
0.3 1.47 1.363 1.181 0 0 1.181
0.4  1.38  1.422   1.194  0   0   1.194
Notes:  ∗   max[z0( p) r – (1/( (1   guc) – 1)   100, 0]   max[3.00 r – 3.71, 0] with p   0.001 
probability of hitting the zero lower bound and     0.99, guc   –0.26.
  
0(0)   1/2w  ∗2   2.248 ∗2;  0(0)     ˜
0(0)     
0(0).
Woodford [2003]) in eﬀect replaces it with a nominal interest rate variability constraint, which 
ensures the ZLB is hardly ever hit. By contrast, the work of a number of authors—including 
Adam and Billi (2007), Coenen and Wieland (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and 
Eggertsson (2006)—study optimal monetary policy with commitment in the face of a nonlinear 
constraint it   0, which allows for frequent episodes of liquidity traps in the form of it   0.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 9 1
the economy from a zero inﬂ  ation steady state to      ∗ diﬀer from   
0(0) 
(but not by much because the steady-  state contributions by far outweigh 
the transitional one).
Table 5.10 summarizes the outcomes of optimized simple rules and the 
optimal rule with a ZLB approximately imposed in model IV. Comparing 
the last columns of tables 5.10 and 5.7 we can see that ZLB considerations 
create a substantial consumption equivalent loss for the ﬁ  xed exchange rate, 
ce, and smaller but signiﬁ  cant one for the regimes FLEX(D) and FLEX(C), 
the latter being almost double the former. Under the FE there is no scope for 
trading oﬀ the variance of the nominal exchange rate with other macroeco-
nomic variances that impact on welfare. Thus, the only way of reducing the 
probability of hitting the lower bound is to increase the steady- state inﬂ  ation 
rate, which rises to 9 percent per quarter. This imposes a very large welfare 
loss, reﬂ  ected in ce   11.4 percent.25 For the Taylor rules there are some trade- 
oﬀs between the variance of the nominal interest rate and the variances of 
inﬂ  ation, consumption, and other variables impacting on welfare. Thus, for 
the optimized rule under a ZLB the variance of the nominal interest rate 
falls from 2.75 (percent)2 to 2.24 (percent)2 as wr increases, at a steady-  state 
inﬂ  ation cost of 2.05 percent per quarter. The consumption equivalent loss 
Table 5.9   Optimal FLEX (D) and FLEX (C) rule with a nominal interest rate ZLB
Model IV
wr   [ ,   ,   y]   var(rn,t)    ˜
0(wr)    ˜
0(0)   ∗     
0(0)    0(0)
A FLEX (D)
0 [0.91 5.0 0.39] 2.75 1.48 1.48 2.53 14.39 15.87
0.5 [1.0 5.0 0.54] 2.52 1.98 1.49 2.32 12.10 13.59
1 [1.0 5.0 0.64] 2.44 2.47 1.51 2.25 11.38 12.89
2 [1.0 5.0 0.78] 2.36 3.40 1.55 2.17 10.59 12.14
3 [1.0 5.0 0.87] 2.32 4.32 1.59 2.13 10.20 11.79
4 [1.0 5.0 0.94] 2.30 5.22 1.61 2.11 10.01 11.62
5 [1.0 5.0 0.99] 2.28 6.13 1.63 2.09 9.82 11.45
10 [1.0 5.0 1.13] 2.26 10.6 1.70 2.07 9.63 11.33
20 [1.0 5.0 1.24] 2.24 19.48 1.75 2.05 9.45 11.20
50 [1.0 5.0 1.34] 2.24 46.02 1.80 2.05 9.45 11.25
B FLEX (C)
0 [0.0 19.90 1.066] 5.21 3.67 3.67 3.14 22.16 25.83
5 [1.0 15.66 5.0] 4.04 11.73 3.99 2.32 12.10 16.09
10 [1.0 12.48 5.0] 3.99 19.38 4.15 2.28 11.68 15.83
15 [1.0 11.27 5.0] 3.97 26.96 4.24 2.27 11.58 15.82
20   [1.0 10.61 5.0]   3.97   34.43   4.30   2.27  11.58   15.88
25. However, full dollarization, for example via a currency board, would result in rn,t   r∗
n,t and 
the ZLB then ceases to be a concern for the domestic country. This would still leave a signiﬁ  cant 
welfare loss for the FIX regime (equal to that reported in table 5.7) of ce   1.25 percent. We are 
grateful to Marc Giannoni for pointing this out.292    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
of the Taylor rules rises from 0.019 percent without ZLB concerns to 0.57 
percent for FLEX(D) and 0.83 percent for FLEX(C), with such concerns.
5.8    Conclusions
Three clear results emerge from our analysis: ﬁ  rst, given our calibration, 
the ﬁ  nancial accelerator has a much larger impact on the performance of the 
optimized ﬁ  xed exchange rate, Taylor, and hybrid interest rate rules than 
the presence of transactions dollarization. In particular, the costs of a ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate regime rises signiﬁ  cantly. Second, the introduction of liability 
dollarization alongside the ﬁ  nancial accelerator increases these costs further. 
Finally, the zero lower bound constraint on the interest rate substantially 
increases the welfare cost of both the ﬁ  xed exchange rate constraint, and 
restricts policy to an optimized Taylor, as opposed to a fully optimal mon-
etary policy rule.
The message for monetary policymakers in emerging market economies 
struggling with frictions and dollarization is: do not try to achieve a double 
inﬂ  ation exchange rate objectives, since this can backﬁ  re and lead to larger 
losses than commonly believed. You should fear to ﬁ  x, not fear to ﬂ  oat! 
Furthermore, central banks should not implicitly target the exchange rate 
by choosing a CPI rather than domestic price inﬂ  ation target. Finally, the 
zero lower bound constraint on the interest rate substantially increases the 
welfare cost of the ﬁ  xed exchange rate constraint, and restricts policy to 
an optimized ﬂ  exible exchange rate Taylor-  type rule, as opposed to a fully 
optimal monetary policy rule. As usual, central banks will have to carefully 
trade oﬀ in setting policy in a simple and monitorable way, with the costs of 
incurring in welfare losses from the higher risk of hitting the zero bound.
All our numerical results of course depend on both our choice of calibra-
tion and aspects of the modeling. On the former, while some experimenta-
tion suggests that the qualitative results should be robust with respect to 
a reasonable choice of alternatives, this will not be necessarily true of our 
quantitative ﬁ  ndings on the welfare costs of various regimes. This suggests 
Table 5.10   Summary of welfare outcome of rules with a nominal interest rate 
ZLB imposed
Model IV
Rule   var(rn,t)   ∗     ˜
0(0)    
0(0)   0(0)   ce(%)
FIX 17.6 8.88 22.9 177 200 11.4
FLEX(D) 2.24 2.05 1.75 9.45 11.2 0.57
FLEX(C) 3.97 2.27 4.24 11.58 11.82 0.83
Optimal   1.58   0.06   1.17  0.01   1.18   0
Note: ce is the consumption equivalent welfare loss compared with the optimal policy given by 
ce   ( i(0) –  OPT(0))/((1 –  )(1 – hC)cy)   10–2, i   FE, Taylor.Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    2 9 3
that future research could be usefully directed at a systems estimation of 
the model using Bayesian maximum likelihood methods now popular in 
the DSGE literature.26 Nor can we assert that our results would withstand 
signiﬁ  cant changes to the model, such as the introduction of a large com-
modity exporting sector (e.g., copper or oil) with prices ﬁ  xed to the dollar 
and a consequent large imported share of consumables. Again, this suggests 
an item for future research.
Appendix A
The Steady State
The BGP zero inﬂ  ation steady- state balanced growth path with consump-




t 1  
K 
t
   
Y 
 t 1  
Y 
 t
   
C 
t 1  
C 
t
   
W 
 t 1  
W 
 t
   1   g
(A2) 
A 
t 1  
A 
t
   1   g(1    ).
Since there are no investment adjustment costs at the steady state, it follows 
that
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It follows from (A1) that
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In what follows we denote the trended steady state of Xt by X. Then the 
rest of the steady state is given by
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26. Castillo, Montoro, and Tuesta (2006) provides a promising ﬁ  rst attempt at estimating 
a small open economy model, with many of the features of found in our chapter, using data 
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(A27)  UMF   UC
R∗
n  
1   R∗
n
,
plus the foreign counterparts. Note that (A28) ignores seigniorage arising in 
a zero inﬂ  ation from growth. The steady steady is completed with
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Units of output are chosen so that P H   P F   1. Hence, T   P   P I   1. 
Hence, with our assumptions regarding  ( ), we have that Q   1. We also 
normalize S   1 in the steady state so that P∗
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Then the steady state of the risk- sharing condition (A30) becomes C   kC∗, 
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Foreign Asset Accumulation and Modiﬁ  ed UIP
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Appendix C
Calibration and Estimation
We begin with estimates of the processes describing the exogenous shocks.
Shock Parameters
We require the AR1 persistence parameters  a,  g,  ∗
g,  r ∗,  P,  UIP, and the 
corresponding standard deviations of white noise processes, sda, sdg, and so 
forth. The following have been estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS).
Peru’s TFP shock (At): AR coeﬃcient: 0.59, SE   1.1 percent
Peru’s ﬁ  scal shock (Gt/Y t): AR coeﬃcient: 0.97, SE   0.2 percent
U.S. ﬁ  scal shock (Gt/Y t): AR coeﬃcient: 0.78, SE   0.8 percent
U.S. Taylor Rule:
(C1)  r∗
n,t   0.94r∗
n,t 1   0.069 ∗
F,t   0.22(yt∗   y∗
t 1)    ∗
R,t.
SE( R)   0.36 percent. Note that the long run of this rule satisﬁ  es the Taylor 
principle that the real interest rate should respond positively to an increase 
in inﬂ  ation.
UIP shock: AR coeﬃcient   0.96, SE   0.32 percent
External ﬁ  nance premium shock: In the absence of any estimates in the lit-
erature this shock is calibrated to take central values for ﬁ  nancial shocks: 
AR coeﬃcient   0.95, SE   0.5 percent.
Preferences
Risk Aversion Parameters: Estimates in the literature suggest the range   ∈ 
[2, 5]. However, for the United States, Bayesian estimates suggest a range 
 ∗ ∈ [2, 3]. Our central estimates are     3,  ∗   2.
Discount Factors: A standard choice is      ∗   0.99300    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
Working Day: A standard value is L∗   0.40 for the United States. We 
choose a slightly higher value L   0.5 for Peru.
Habit Parameters: hC   0.7 (CMT), h∗
C   0.5 (LOWW)
Substitution Elasticity: A standard choice for small open economies is     
 ∗   1.5.
Elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to money bal-
ances  ,  ∗: We examine a range  ,  ∗ ∈ [0.01, 0.03] for which money 
balances and consumption are complements.
Home currency consumption transactions: a ∈ [0, 1],  M   4. Estimated by 
CMT.
Technology
Depreciation Rates: A standard choice is      ∗   0.025.
Common World Growth Rate: We choose a realistic common world growth 
rates: g   g∗   3 percent per annum.
Investment Adjustment Costs: We match Peru with European data using an 
estimate from SW, for United States we use LOWW obtaining S  (1   g) 
  6.0, [S (1   g)]∗   4.0 from SW.
Capital Shares:     0.5 (CMT),  ∗   0.33(LOWW)
Investment Substitution Elasticities:  I    I ∗   0.25
Financial Accelerator
Elasticity:      –  0.065,  ∗
    –  0.05 (BGG)
Home currency borrowing for capital: ϕ ∈ [0, 1]
Survival rate: ξe   ξe ∗   0.93 (GGN)
Asset/Debt Ratio: nk   0.4, n∗
k   0.7 (BGG)
FA Risk Premium:     0.035,  ∗   0.05 (BGG)
UIP Risk Premium:  r   0.01
Market Power
Labor Market Power:     3 (SW), corresponding to a 50 percent markup, 
 ∗   6, corresponding to a 20 percent markup.
Product Market Power: ζ   7.67 corresponding to a 15 percent (SW, LOWW).
Pricing
Calvo Contract: A standard value ξH   ξ∗
F   0.66, corresponding to 3 quarter 
price contracts on average (see CMT).
Consumption, Investment, Money Balance, and Trade Shares
Standard values for the United States are c∗
y   0.6, i∗
y   0.2, gy   0.2, and 
zy   0.25 (the latter zy   Z/PY is money stock as a proportion of quarterly 
GDP). For Peru we choose cy   0.7, iy   0.15, gy   0.1.5, and zy   0.25 (as 
for the United States).
Trade Shares: Total exports and imports are around 25 percent for Peru 
so 0.25   csimports   isimports   csexports   isexports for balanced trade. Data Monetary Rules in Emerging Economies    3 0 1
on consumption and capital goods exports show isimports/csimports   1.6 
and isexports/csexports   0.1. Hence, we choose csimports   0.10, isimports   0.15, 
csexports   0.23, and isexports   0.02.
Derived Parameters
Given these estimates and data observations, we can now calibrate the 
following parameters. Preference Parameters (b,  ,  ) are found by solving 
the set of equations
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For central values of  , assuming     0.01, we obtain: b   0.95,     0.28, 
    0.17 for Peru data and b∗   0.99,     0.39, and     0.66 for U.S. data.
Demand elasticities calibrated from trade data:
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Note the small open economy implication that  C,F    I,F   0. Then we 
have
      
 C,H    e
C,H   
cy
   
cy   csimports   
cy
   I   
 I,H  
iy
.
Remaining calibrated parameters are:
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Appendix D
Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and Corollary 2
Proposition 1. To study the FIX regime, we need to augment the system 
with a deﬁ  nitional equation relating the change in the nominal exchange rate 
to the change in the terms of trade and inﬂ  ation. First, we assume that foreign 
prices are ﬁ  xed, so in log terms 0    p∗
F,t    (pF,t –   st)    (pH,t    t –   st), 
where  t is the terms of trade in deviation form. Thus,
(D1)  st   st 1    t    t 1    Ht.
In addition, from the ﬁ  rst- order conditions for consumption, we have a rela-
tionship between the real exchange rate and marginal utility of consumption 
rert   u∗
c,t –   uc,t, and linearization of (10) yields rert     t. Hence,




[uct   uc,t 1   (u∗
c,t   u∗
c,t 1)]    Ht.
Note that the implication of this equation is that feedback on the nominal 
exchange rate via (52) is a form of “integral control” (i.e., a sum of all past 
values) on inﬂ  ation. It is known that integral control rules are very robust 
in terms of their stabilization properties.
Now put rn,t   r∗
n,t    sst, as discussed previously; it is now easy to show 
that taken together with (62), this implies
(D3)  Etst 1   (1    s)st,
from which we deduce that the nominal exchange rate is given by st   0 for 
all t. Note that this implies from (D2) that uc,t and  H,t are related under 
this feedback regime and therefore cannot “jump” independently of one 
another. Thus, we require that the part of the system that describes the 
joint behavior of these two variables must have one stable and one unstable 
eigenvalue. It is easy now to ascertain that their joint characteristic equation 
becomes
(D4) (z   1)( z   1)     z   0,
where z is the forward operator. It is also easy to show that one root of 
this equation is greater than 1, and the other lies between 0 and 1. Hence, 
proposition 1 follows.
Proposition 2. Ignoring all exogenous and stochastic variables, yields a 
characteristic equation for (60), (65), and (62) given by
(D5) (z    )[(z   1)( z   1)     z]   (1    )  z[κ(z   1)     ]   0.
The eﬀects of dollarization can be assessed through the variation in κ, which 
is a function of a, where 1 –   a is the degree of dollarization.304    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
As pointed out in the previous section, the case of no dollarization is easily 
seen to be equivalent to that of a separable utility function. Indeed, for the 
case     1, this is equivalent to the case of a closed economy. For the case 
of a partially dollarized economy, κ   0 is possible when consumption and 
real balances are complements, and it turns out that the results depend on 
the degree of dollarization.
For determinacy, since there are two jump variables, we require exactly 
two unstable roots. First note that when      0, the eigenvalues of the system 
are given by   and the roots of (z –   1)( z –   1) –     z; it is easy to show that 
one of the latter roots is greater and the other is less than 1, so the system 
is indeterminate. As    →  , the roots tend to –    and 1 –     /κ, so that the 
system has two unstable roots if 1 –     /κ   –   1, as in (b), as required for 
determinacy, but only one unstable root for (b).
Equation (D.9) describes the root locus method that enables to track the 
path of the roots in the complex plane as    changes. In this case, it is easy to 
show that the smaller of the two stable roots heads for z   0 as    increases 
to  . Also, as    increases to a value slightly beyond 1, the other two roots 
move closer to one another. They merge into a double root at a value of 
z   1; to show this, we note that z   1 when      1, so we need to prove that 
increasing    beyond 1 leads to a root larger than 1. It is trivial to show that 




∂  ⏐   z 1
   
  
   
     (1    )(1       κ)
.
This is greater than 0 for both (a) and (b). From this double root there are 
then two branches out into the complex plane, which merge for a much larger 
value of    on to the negative part of the real axis, and then the roots diverge, 
one to –  , and the other to 1 –    /κ. Thus for case (b), there are two unstable 
roots for all   , provided that the root locus does not pass through the unit 
circle. Likewise for (a), if it does not pass through the unit circle, then there 
are two unstable roots for 1          
 , where   
  is the value of    such that 
there is a root at z   –  1; there is an additional proviso, that the root locus 












+ )(1− )+ (2(1+ ) = − (1− )] (
     
                 / 2 2 − )     
which is also greater than 0 for case (b). Finally we need to show that when 
the root locus is oﬀ the real line, it does not cross the unit circle, which is 
characterized by z   ei    cos     i sin  . To ﬁ  nd a potential crossing, we 
substitute this into (D5) (with     0, j   0), then multiply by ei  and equate 
real and imaginary parts to 0. These yield
(D8) 0      cos 2    (1                  ) cos     1 
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(D9) 0      sin 2    (1                  ) sin       (1    )κ sin  .
There are obviously roots at sin     0, which corresponds to (i) z   1,      1, 
which explains why we there is indeterminacy for      1 (ii) z   –  1, which 
only corresponds to positive    for case (a). The alternative, after removing 
the factor sin   from (D9), is that 0   2  cos   –  (1          –        )     (1 
–    )κ. Substituting for cos   from this expression into (D8) yields a unique 
value of   . But for the locus to branch at a value of z   1, and return to the 
real line at a value of z   –  1, it needs to cross the unit circle twice, but this 
is ruled out by this unique value of   .27
Corollary 2. First note that of all the parameters in (D5), only κ is depen-
dent on dollarization, via the term a 
(1 –   b1). The eﬀect of increasing a on this 
term is given by
(D10) 
d(a 
(1   b1))
  
da
   
 MB(a M   (1   a)  M)(  1)/( M 1))
      
(a M   (1   a)  M)2(b   B(a M   (1   a) M)(  1)/( M 1))2
a M 1(1   a)  M 1(b   B(a M   (1   a)  M)(  1)/( M 1)) 
  
    1
 
 M   1
ba M(a M 1   (1   a)  M 1),
where B   (1 –   b) b1–   (1 –    )1– .
Given that     1, and in our calibrations we use  M   1, it is easy to see that 
this is increasing for a   1/2. But dollarization is associated with decreasing 
a, which leads to a decrease in   as a decrease from 1/2 to 0. Thus, we have 
corollary 2 in the main text.
Appendix E
Quadratic Approximation of the Welfare Loss
The basic idea is to obtain the quadratic approximation to the social 
planner’s problem, coupled with a term in inﬂ  ation, which arises from price 
dispersion. We adopt a “small distortions” approximation, which is accurate 
as long as the zero inﬂ  ation steady- state is close to the social optimum. As we 
have noted in the main text, the existence of external habit oﬀsets the distor-
tions in the product and labor markets. For our calibrated high value for the 
27. For the case (1    )      , the unit circle could be crossed once by the root locus, imply-
ing that there may be a limited range of determinacy.306    Nicoletta Batini, Paul Levine, and Joseph Pearlman
habit parameter hC, this leaves the steady state of the decentralized economy 
close to the social optimum, justifying the small distortions approximation.




∑  t (Ct   hCCt 1)(1  )(1  )(1   Lt) (1  )
    
1    
,
subject to the (resource) constraints:
(E2) 1         Tt
  1   Et
  1 1     I    ITt
 I 1   EIt
 I 1  Kt   (1    )Kt 1   It
(E3)  Y t       AtK 
t 1Lt
1      Et
  Tt
 Ct   (1    ∗)Tt
 Ct∗    IEIt
  ITt
 IIt 
  (1    I∗)Tt
 I
∗It∗   Gt
where the terms of trade are given by T   P F/P H, and the real exchange rate as 
E   SP∗/P, so that E1–      P F
1–   /[ P H
1–      (1 –   )PF
1–   ]. There is a risk- sharing 
condition given by







(1  )(1  ) 1 (1   Lt) (1  )   Ct∗(1  )(1  ) 1 (1   Lt∗) (1  )
where we assume initial wealth per capita is the same in each country.
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 Ct∗    IEIt
  ITt
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  (1    I ∗)Tt
 I
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t 1Lt
1  )    3t(1     
   Tt
  1   Et
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 I 1   EIt
 I 1) 
   5t(EtCt
(1  )(1  ) 1(1   Lt) (1  )   UC∗) 
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First-  order conditions with respect to C, Z, E, T, EI, I, L, and K yield
(E6) 0    (1    )(C   Z)(1  )(1  ) 1(1   L) (1  )     1hC    2 E  T 
   5[(1    )(1    )   1]E(C   Z)(1  )(1  ) 1(1   L) (1  )
(E7) 0     (1    )(C   Z)(1  )(1  ) 1 (1   L) (1  )    1
   5[(1    )(1    )   1]E(C   Z)(1  )(1  ) 1 (1   L) (1  )
(E8) 0      2  E   1T C    3(    1)E  2    5(C   Z)(1  )(1  ) 1
  (1   L) (1  )
(E9) 0     2T  1( E  C   (1    )C∗)    2 IT I 1 ( IEI
  II   (1    I)I∗
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(E10) 0       2 I IEI
  I 1T II    4( I   1)EI
 I
(E11) 0     2 IEI
  IT  I    6
(E12) 0       (C   Z)(1  )(1  )(1   L) (1  ) 1    2A(1    )K L  
   5 (1    )E(C   Z)(1  )(1  ) 1(1   L) (1  ) 1




   1    .
In steady state these satisfy









   1        IRK   4(1    I)    2 I II
(E15)   3 (1    )    2( C    I(1    I
2)I)  (1     hC) 1       2
(E16)   5F     
 2  
 
[ (1    2)C    I(1    I
2)I]
where
(E17)  F   (C(1   hC))(1  )(1  ) 1(1   L) (1  ).
Also deﬁ  ne
(E18)  F1   (C(1   hC))(1  )(1  )(1   L) (1  )   C(1   hC)F.





(1    )[(1    )(1    )   1](ct   hCct 1)2
     
(1   hC)2  
 2
(1    )(1    ) L(ct   hCct 1)lt
    
(1   hC)(1   L)
   
 [(1    )    1]L2lt
2
   
(1   L)2 





[2 3   3    1     (1    )2]
  
 2I I  
2
[(1    I)2(     3     )   1    I
3    I(1   3 I




 2A (1    )K L1  
   
2
(kt 1   lt)2    2AK L1  [(1    )lt    kt 1]at
(E22)   2(  (1    )Cct    (1    ∗)Cct∗ 
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(E23)   2( (1    2)C    I(1    2)I)
  [(1    )(1    )   1]
ct∗   hCc∗
t 1   
1   hC
   (1    ) 
L∗lt∗
 
1   L∗ t.
Price dispersion arising from price setting behavior by ﬁ  rms yields a 
second- order  term
(E24)    
 LF 1  
2(1   L)
 
ζξH   
(1   ξH)(1    ξH)
 t
2.
Finally, we require an expression for  2, which is obtained from





   
 (1    )
  
 (1   L)
[ ( 2   1)C    I( I
2   1)I]   
  
 C(1   hC)F
  
1   L
.
If     1, it follows that  2   0. Note, too, that we may write
(E26)   2   
  
 cy(1   hC)F
       
[(1    )RK Iky/ ][(1   L)/L]   [ (1    )/ ][ ( 2   1)cy    I( I
2   1)iy]
.
Finally we can divide all terms by FY, and by writing F1   FY(1 –   hC)cy, we 
can obtain all weights in terms of ratios cy, iy, ky, (1 –   L)/L, and parameters.
Note that there is an issue here of which values C, L we use in all of 
these expressions. There is an additional representation of  2 for the social 
planner’s problem, which leads ultimately to a linear relationship between 
C and L, and then via the goods market equation to a complete expression 
for each of these. One can go through this procedure, or just use the steady- 
state values of observed ratios C/Y, I/Y, and G/Y. We choose to do the latter.
To obtain the quadratic form, deﬁ  ne
(E27)  cmclt   
ct   hCct 1   
1   hC
(E28)  kmlt   kt 1   lt
(E29)  cciit     (1    )cyct    (1    ∗)cyct∗    I I(1    I)iyit 
   I ∗(1    I ∗)iyit∗
(E30)  ccslst   [(1    )(1    )   1]
ct∗   hCc∗
t 1   
1   hC
   (1    ) 
L∗lt∗
 
1   L∗.
And deﬁ  ne
(E31)  =
−








[( ) ][( ) ] (
1
11 1 // / ] [ [ () () ] 22 11 −+ − ci yII y
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Converting the welfare approximation into welfare loss, and dividing by 
FY leads to
(E32) 2W    (1   hC)cy(1    )[(1    )(1    )   1]cmclt
2 
  2(1    ) (1    )cmclt
Llt  
1   L
   
 [(1    )    1]L2lt
2
   
(1   L)2 
  ( cy [2 3   3    1     (1    )2]  
 iy I  
2
  [(1    I)2(     3     )   1    I
3    I(1   3 I
2   2 I
3)]) t
2
   
    Y
 
Y
 (1    )kmlt
2   2 
    Y
 
Y
ytat   2 cciit t 
  2 ccslst t   
 L(1   hC)
  
(1   L)
 
ζξH   
(1   ξH)(1    ξH)
 t
2,
which corresponds to (57) in the main text.
The change in welfare for a small change in consumption- equivalent over 
all periods is given by
(E33)       (1    ) 
t=0
 
∑  tC(1   hC)(1  )(1  ) 1(1   L) (1  )( C   hC C)
 
 
(1    )(1   hC)cy   
1    
FYce.
Ignoring the term in FY   C(1 –  hC)(1–   )(1–   )– 1(1 –  L) (1–   )Y, since all the welfare 
loss terms have been normalized by this, we can rewrite this as
(E34)  ce   
(1    )  
  
(1    )(1   hC)cy
.
Furthermore, if all welfare loss terms have been further normalized by 
(1 –    ), and that all variances are expressed in percent2, it follows that we 
can write ce in percent terms as
(E35)  ce   
  
  
(1    )(1   hC)cy
   10 2,
which corresponds to (61) in the main text.
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Comment  Frederic S. Mishkin
There are several key features of emerging market economies that make 
them very diﬀerent from advanced economies: they have weak ﬁ  scal, mone-
tary policy, and ﬁ  nancial institutional frameworks that lead to high levels of 
transactions and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies (dollarization) 
and larger credit market imperfections.1 The chapter by Batini, Levine, and 
Pearlman is very nice because, given the special features of emerging market 
economies, it asks exactly the right questions in examining macroeconomic 
policy issues in these economies: (a) How do ﬁ  nancial frictions aﬀect mac-
roeconomic volatility and monetary policy? (b) Because of extensive dol-
larization, should the exchange rate have a special role in monetary policy?
In my discussion of the chapter, I will ﬁ  rst discuss what it does, as well as 
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